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ABSTRACT: Many current popular views in epistemology require a belief to be the 
result of a reliable process (aka ‘method of belief formation’ or ‘cognitive capacity’) in 
order to count as knowledge. This means that the generality problem rears its head, i.e. 
the kind of process in question has to be spelt out, and this looks difficult to do without 
being either over or under-general. In response to this problem, I propose that we 
should adopt a more fine-grained account of the epistemic basing relation, at which 
point the generality problem becomes easy to solve. 
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1. The Generality Problem 
Despite the widely agreed failure of process reliabilism as a theory of justification, 
process reliabilism is alive and well in contemporary discussions of the theory of 
knowledge. Although epistemologists may not often refer to themselves as process 
reliabilists, all of the currently popular positions on the theory of knowledge, from 
modal epistemologies like safety and sensitivity theories, to virtue reliabilism, 
include versions of a process reliabilist condition (which is to say that they all 
consider it a necessary condition for a belief to be knowledge that it was formed as 
the result of a reliable process). They look to how a belief was formed (the 
relevant ‘method of belief formation’ as modal reliabilists say, or the belief 
forming ‘capacities’ or ‘abilities’ involved as virtue reliabilists say) and require that 
beliefs so-formed are reliable (generally modally reliable).  
Given this, one well-known problem for traditional justification-centric 
process reliabilism, ‘the generality problem,’1 takes on a renewed urgency, since it 
also applies to many currently popular positions.2 In a nutshell, the generality 
problem is the fact that an instance of belief formation can be described as the 
                                                                
1 See Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, “The Generality Problem for Reliabilism,” Philosophical 
Studies 89:1 (1998): 1-29. 
2 This is in addition to the argument made by Bishop, claiming that any plausible account of 
justification is going to have to face something like the generality problem. See Michael Bishop, 
“Why the Generality Problem is Everybody’s Problem,” Philosophical Studies 151:2 (2010): 285-
298. 
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result of a number of different processes and the process reliabilist needs a 
principled way of determining which one exactly has to be reliable (in whatever 
sense of ‘reliability’ is at play) in order for their process reliability condition to be 
met. Furthermore, there is a potential trap in store for the unwitting process 
reliabilist: make the relevant processes too narrow and specific to particular 
occasions and the condition becomes too easily met (at the limit, the process will 
be so specific as to be a one-case, unrepeatable, event and so whether a belief is 
reliably formed will collapse into the question of whether it is actually true or 
not). On the other hand, make the process too broad and epistemically important 
features of the way that the belief was actually formed will end up being 
overlooked. For instance, if we count all the visually based beliefs that I form in 
fake-barn county in the same way then we have missed out something important, 
since we have rolled together unreliable beliefs about the presence of barns and 
perfectly reliable beliefs about the flashing ‘check engine’ light on my dashboard. 
The generality problem poses a challenge for process reliabilists then: to give a 
principled account of the relevant kind of process and to do so in such a way that 
it avoids the bind of being either too general or too specific. 
When looking to assess the reliability of some belief, the generality problem 
demands that we specify which other (actual or counterfactual) cases of believing 
that p have to be accurate in order for the belief under consideration to count as 
reliable. It may seem that a modal reliability condition, like safety, provides an 
answer to this question: we need to look at just those beliefs which are formed in 
nearby possible worlds.3 However, not all of the nearby worlds in which one 
believes that p are in fact relevant to the safety of one’s belief. This is because the 
safety of a belief is relativised to the method by which it was formed. Roughly put, 
it does not matter if you might easily have falsely believed that p, so long as you 
wouldn’t have done so by forming your belief in the same way as you actually do.  
So although only nearby worlds are relevant to assessing the reliability of a 
belief according to safety, not all nearby worlds are (only those in which one 
forms the belief that p in the same way as one actually does). So the generality 
problem is not yet fully solved until we can give an account of the method of 
belief formation at play in a given case, and of course do so in a way which avoids 
the bind of being either too general or too specific. 
 
                                                                
3 Of course, one may worry that this is too vague a notion to do the job required, but let us not 
dwell on this point. 
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2. Comesaña’s Solution 
Juan Comesaña takes up this challenge.4 He suggests that the relevant kind of 
process (the one which needs to be reliable if your belief is to be knowledge)5 is 
forming the belief that you did on the basis of the evidence that you did. I think 
that this focus on epistemic basing and reasons for belief is right: those are exactly 
the epistemically relevant things (they are exactly the kinds of things that matter 
for justification too) and so are exactly what we should be looking at. However 
Comesaña’s suggestion involving very narrow processes is misguided; it falls into 
the trap of being too specific. Comesaña’s suggestion is that: 
A belief is well-founded iff it is based on evidence E and “the type producing a 
belief that p based on evidence E is a reliable type.”6 
The problem with this is that if E refers to a very specific body of evidence, then 
the process is too narrow. For example, consider this twist on a fake barn case: 
Red barn7 
Henry is driving through fake barn county (an area populated with fake barn 
facades) and (twist 1) Henry knows that he is driving through fake barn county. 
But what he doesn’t know is that (twist 2) the fake barns in fake barn county are 
always green, and the real ones always red. He sees a red barn in a field by the 
road and he believes on the basis of this visual evidence that there is a red barn 
in the field.  
Clearly Henry’s belief that there is a red barn isn’t justified and it isn’t 
knowledge. The problem is that his belief is formed in an unreliable way (e.g. it 
isn’t safe or sensitive, and as he continues to form beliefs like this as he drives 
through fake barn county, many of them are false). But given that Henry’s 
evidence E is his visual perception as of a red barn, and the belief that he forms on 
this basis is that there is a red barn, then Henry’s belief forming process is reliable 
on Comesaña’s account. After all, Henry’s perceptions as of red barns do track the 
presence of red barns in the actual world as well as relevant counterfactual ones. 
To avoid this problem, Comesaña’s account needs to broaden the 
conception of the relevant evidence E, so that it refers not to a specific body of 
                                                                
4 Juan Comesaña, “A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem,” Philosophical Studies 
129:1 (2006): 27-47. 
5 Or, in the context that he approaches the challenge, justification. 
6 Juan Comesaña, “A Well-Founded Solution,” 38. 
7 Kripke used a similar red barn case, but where Henry was not aware that he was in red barn 
country, and in relation to a point about knowledge. See Saul Kripke, Philosophical Troubles: 
Collected Papers Vol I (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 186. 
Kevin Wallbridge 
348 
evidence, but to a more general kind of evidence. Only in this way will the 
relevant method of belief formation be applicable to a suitably wide range of cases. 
He needs to give an account of what kinds of beliefs, formed on the basis of what 
kind of evidence, need to be reliable in order for a given belief count as 
knowledge. In other words, we have to say in which possible worlds does a belief 
that p count as being formed via the same method. But this is just an epicycle of 
the generality problem: the challenge remains to specify what kind of process is 
the relevant one, the one that has to be reliable.  
3. A Novel Solution 
My suggestion is that we should work with a more fine-grained conception of the 
roles that reasons play in belief formation, conceiving of them in a more 
psychologically plausible way. The usual method employed in epistemology 
involves attempting to capture the process of belief formation and the nature of 
reasons in terms of a picture on which a body of evidence stands in a causal and 
rationalising relation to a particular propositional belief. It seems to me that this is 
too coarse-grained a picture of what goes on to capture everything of epistemic 
interest. Once we have a more fine-grained alternative in view, the generality 
problem will not look so problematic. 
Consider an example:  
In the morning you see £200 on the kitchen table and over breakfast Tina tells 
you that she is buying something off of a friend today. Later on you see Tina’s 
friend Sam coming up to the house with an interestingly shaped box and a little 
while later you hear the sound of an electric guitar coming from Tina’s room. On 
the basis of everything that you have seen and heard that day, you believe that 
Tina has bought an electric guitar from Sam for £200. 
In this case, a simple picture accounting for what happens is that you have a 
certain body of perceptions as of certain events, this body of evidence constitutes a 
reason for you to form some belief, and so you form that belief. In other words, 
the sum of everything that you have seen and heard gives you sufficient reason to 
believe that Tina has bought an electric guitar from Sam for £200, and you form 
that belief on this basis. While this is doubtless true, this coarse-grained 
description fails to capture some of the important facts about the reasons you have 
for your believing as you do and the way that you form your belief as a result. 
If you had not seen the £200 on the kitchen table then you would not have 
had reason to believe that Tina has bought an electric guitar from Sam for £200, 
you just would have had reason to believe that Tina has bought an electric guitar 
from Sam. Relatedly, if you had seen £400, not £200, on the kitchen table then 
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you would have had reason to believe that Tina has bought an electric guitar from 
Sam for £400, not £200. (One natural way of expressing what these considerations 
show is to say that your reason for believing that Tina bought a guitar from Sam 
for £200 is your seeing that amount of money on the kitchen table.) 
Reflection on this case seems to show that you have reason to believe as you 
do because various of the particular things that you have seen and heard give you 
reason to endorse different fine-grained aspects of the content of the proposition 
that Tina bought a guitar from Sam for £200. The reasons for which you believe 
are not all reasons for you to believe the whole of that particular proposition. 
They do not all give you some small degree of indiscriminate evidence for the 
whole proposition. Instead, each of the things that you have seen and heard gives 
you compelling evidence for some particular aspect of the content of the 
proposition: the who, the what, the how much, etc.  
On this view, the epistemic reason-relation can relate quite specific features 
of one’s body of evidence to fine-grained elements of the content of a given belief. 
More generally, this is an example of the fact that reasons are combinatorial and so 
the fact that some evidence base provides reason for a particular belief owes to the 
combinatorial effect of a complex of contributory reasons. (Which can be much 
more complicated than the toy example I have given.) 
(The claim that some kind of combinatorial structure applies to the kinds of 
reasons that ordinary human thought engages with – even if the details do not 
exactly match up with the rough sketch that I have employed here, which has 
focused on a simple compositional case – can be argued for on the basis of the 
systematicity and productivity of our responsiveness to reasons. This indicates that 
combinatorial structure is at work in even seemingly simple cases like direct 
perceptual beliefs.) 
With this alternative understanding of the structure of reasons as 
productively and systematically combinatorial, solving the generality problem 
becomes simple. Comesaña was along the right lines in thinking that process 
reliabilists should be focusing on the reasons which a subject is responding to in 
forming a particular belief. But we must then note that the reasons which a 
subject is responding to have a complex, combinatorial, structure. There is not just 
one kind of reason contributing to a given belief; there are many, all making 
individual contributions to what exactly there is overall reason to believe. Given 
this picture, a process reliabilist should maintain that all of these need to be 
reliable in order for a belief to be knowledge. This avoids both of the traps 
mentioned earlier: by requiring the reliability of all of these kinds of reasons 
responsiveness, nothing of epistemic importance is left out; but we do not consider 
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anything too highly specific since each of the individual kinds of reasons 
responsiveness involved can and would apply to many other beliefs as well and 
their overall reliability will therefore depend on their truth-conduciveness in 
these other cases too.  
For instance, in the red barn case Henry believes that there is a red barn 
because of the barn-like quality of his perception, but this is not a reliable way of 
forming beliefs since it would easily lead him to have false beliefs about green 
barns. 
4. Conclusion 
The generality problem poses a question to process reliabilists: how should we 
understand the ‘process’ in process reliabilism; what exactly has to be reliable in 
order for a belief to be knowledge? I have argued that the answer we should give 
is that the processes, plural, relevant to this epistemic evaluation are all of the 
many kinds of reasons responsiveness which are involved in the formation of that 
belief, in accordance with an understanding of the structure of reasons as complex 
and combinatorial. This gives us a principled solution to the generality problem. 
